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An Uneven Playing Field: The
Government Extended Rights
Denied to Defendants on Appeal*
by Breyana Fleming
I. INTRODUCTION
Many people find themselves in the crosshairs of the criminal justice
system as defendants. In preparing to defend themselves against the
charges being brought by the government, these defendants cannot
predict whether the outcome of a criminal proceeding will result in a
finding of innocence or guilt. Defendants can, however, generally
depend on uniformity in the law as it pertains to appellate procedure.
Still, there are times where this uniformity will be sacrificed, and
further, when it will be done in an unjust manner. For instance, when
an appellate court allows the federal government to maintain an
argument against a defendant it never raised on appeal, uniformity in
appellate procedure is sacrificed unjustly. In United States v.
Campbell,1 this kind of injustice took place.2 In this case, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied the good-faith
reliance exception to an officer's actions of unlawfully prolonging a
traffic stop through unrelated inquiry because the officer was relying in
good-faith on United States v. Griffin,3 the binding precedent at the
time.4 Significantly, the court exercised its discretion in hearing the
issue despite the government's failure to properly raise the issue in any
oral argument, initial brief, or any other supplemental filing to the

*I would like to thank Professor Timothy Floyd for serving as my faculty advisor and
his continuing support. I would also like to thank Maria Middlebrooks, Reginald
Middlebrooks, and Dutch for all of their love and encouragement.
1. 912 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2019).
2. See id.
3. 696 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2010).
4. Campbell, 912 F.3d at 1355–1356.
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court.5 An in-depth analysis of the majority opinion will show, however,
that this decision unfairly prejudiced Campbell in order to provide
protection to the federal government.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Deputy Sheriff Robert McCannon was patrolling the interstate at
night when he noticed that a Nissan Maxima crossed the fog line. Upon
seeing this, McCannon activated the camera on his dashboard, at which
point he noticed the vehicle cross over the fog line again, and further,
that the vehicle had a signal light which was blinking at an unusually
rapid pace. As a result of these infractions, the officer pulled the vehicle
over and came upon Erickson Campbell, whom he asked for his driver's
license and registration. After explaining to Campbell the reasons why
he was stopped, McCannon determined that he would issue him a
warning for failure to adhere to two Georgia traffic violations: (1) failing
to maintain signal lights in a good working condition, 6 and (2) failing to
maintain his own lane.7 While writing the ticket, McCannon began to
question Campbell about the purpose of his travels. McCannon learned
that Campbell was on his way to Augusta in order to see his family,
that he held a job, had previously been arrested over sixteen years ago
for a DUI, and that he was not traveling with a firearm. 8
Further, during the time that McCannon continued writing out the
warning ticket for Campbell, Deputy Patrick Paquette arrived on the

5. Id.
6. O.C.G.A. § 40–8–26 (2018). The statute states in pertinent part:
(a) Any motor vehicle may be equipped . . . with the following signal lights or
devices:
. . ..
(2) A light or lights or mechanical signal device capable of clearly indicating
any intention to turn either to the right or to the left and which shall be visible
from both the front and the rear.
(b) Every . . . signal light or lights indicating intention to turn shall be visible
and understandable during daytime and nighttime from a distance of 300 feet
from both the front and the rear. . . . [S]uch light or lights shall at all times be
maintained in good working condition.
7. O.C.G.A. § 40–6–48 (2018). The statute states in pertinent part:
Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes
for traffic, the following rules, in addition to all others consistent with this
Code section, shall apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single
lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first
ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.
8. Campbell, 912 F.3d at 1344–1345.
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scene.9 At this point, McCannon asked Campbell more questions on the
following topics:
McCannon: Any counterfeit merchandise that you're taking to your
relatives in Augusta? And what I mean by that is—any purses?
Shoes? Shirts? Any counterfeit or bootleg CDs or DVDs? Anything
like that? Any illegal alcohol? Any marijuana? Any cocaine?
Methamphetamine? Any heroin? Any ecstasy? Nothing like that? You
don't have any dead bodies in your car?" Campbell shakes his head or
otherwise responds in the negative to each question.10

This particular line of questioning lasted for twenty-five seconds.11
When Campbell stated that he did not have any of those items,
McCannon requested to search his vehicle to confirm the truthfulness of
his statements to him, to which Campbell obliged. As such, McCannon
had Campbell sign the ticket and then he and Paquette begin to search
Campbell's vehicle. Their search revealed a 9mm semi-automatic pistol,
9mm ammunition, a black stocking cap, and a face mask in a bag
hidden under the carpet in Campbell's trunk. Once McCannon and
Paquette found the gun, Campbell admitted that he had lied about
having it because he was a convicted felon.12
Consequently, Campbell was arrested and indicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1),13 for being in possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. In
his defense, Campbell filed a motion to suppress the evidence. 14
However, the district court denied Campbell's motion to suppress,
convicting him of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 15 First,
the district court determined that McCannon had reasonable suspicion
to make a traffic stop under Georgia's statute, as his rapidly blinking
turning signal was not in good working condition. Second, the district
court addressed whether the traffic stop became an unreasonable
seizure under the Fourth Amendment16 when McCannon prolonged it
with his unrelated inquiry. The district court determined that
McCannon's inquiry in reference to whether Campbell had contraband,
drugs, or dead bodies in the vehicle, lasting for about twenty-five
seconds, was unrelated to the purpose of the stop because they did not

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1347.
Id.
Id. at 1345.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2015).
Campbell, 912 F.3d at 1345.
Id. at 1347–1348.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
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relate to road safety concerns. Following the precedent set in United
States v. Griffin,17 however, the district court held that McCannon had
not unlawfully prolonged the stop because the overall length of
prolongation was reasonable, and he had acted diligently in issuing his
warning ticket. The district court declined to address whether the goodfaith reliance exception to the exclusionary rule applied. 18
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated
that it agreed with the district court that the precedent set in Griffin
was controlling.19 The Eleventh Circuit, however, did address the goodfaith reliance exception to the exclusionary rule, deciding that it would
hear the issue despite the government's failure to preserve the issue on
appeal.20 Thus, in applying its discretionary authority to hear an issue
first raised on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that because
McCannon relied in good-faith on the binding precedent in Griffin, the
subsequent ruling in Rodriguez v. United States,21 did not make the
prolongation of the traffic stop through his unrelated inquiry turn into
an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.22
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment: Protection Against Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures
1. The Clause
As determined in Mapp v. Ohio,23 The Constitution's Fourth
Amendment Clause protects peoples' right to privacy from being
infringed upon by searches and seizures which are not founded on a
basis of reasonable suspicion.24 The Fourth Amendment states, in
pertinent part, that, "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated."25 Because security of one's privacy
against intrusion by the police is a liberty guaranteed by the principles

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

696 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2010).
Campbell, 912 F.3d at 1349.
Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1355–1356.
135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015).
Campbell, 912 F.3d. at 1356.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 646–647.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
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of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 26 the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the states to ensure that there is no
arbitrary denial of life, liberty, and property by the government. 27
2. The Subsequent Adoption of the Exclusionary Rule
Though the Fourth Amendment itself does not explicitly prohibit the
entering of evidence in violation of its clause, the United States
Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule. 28 The exclusionary rule, a
prudential doctrine, prohibits evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment from being used in a
criminal proceeding.29 Because the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against both the states and the federal government, the exclusionary
rule is also enforceable against these actors. 30 As such, evidence
unlawfully obtained by law enforcement will be suppressed under the
exclusionary rule.31
However, the application of the exclusionary rule is not without
limitations.32 As with any other judicially created remedial device, the
application of the rule is restricted to those areas where its remedial
objectives are best served.33 The exclusionary rule is designed to
safeguard constitutional rights, meaning that it is not concerned with
the personal constitutional rights of the aggrieved party.34 Hence,
because the exclusionary rule's sole purpose is to deter unlawful
conduct which is in contention with the Fourth Amendment, the rule
will not apply in the case that suppression fails to yield appreciable
deterrence, making exclusion unnecessary.35
3. An Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Good-Faith
Reliance on Binding Precedent
In United States v. Leon,36 the Court carved out the good-faith
reliance exception to the exclusionary rule, finding that the costs of
excluding evidence outweighs its deterrent value when an officer

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
Herring v. U.S., 555 U.S. 135, 139–140 (2009).
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
Herring, 555 U.S. at 139–140.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
Id.
Id.
Id.
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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objectively relies on binding precedent.37 The court determined that the
good-faith reliance exception applied to an officer's acts in obtaining a
warrant from a magistrate who found that there was probable cause for
its issuance.38 In this particular case, upon receiving an affidavit of
observed drug-trafficking activities, an officer requested the issuance of
warrants of the defendants' home and vehicles, which was subsequently
issued by the magistrate court. The search produced drugs and the
defendants were indicted on drug offenses, all moving to have the
evidence suppressed. The district court granted the motions in part,
finding that the affidavit lacked sufficient evidence of probable cause
and that it would not consider the good-faith reliance exception to the
officer's actions. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 39
The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed with the findings
below, holding that the good-faith reliance exception to the exclusionary
rule should be recognized because the officer reasonably relied in goodfaith on the validity of the warrant issued by the magistrate, who made
its own probable-cause determination and judgment that the warrant
was in the appropriate technical form. 40 Further, the Court concluded
that the evidence should not be suppressed under the exclusionary rule
because there is no deterrence effect on punishing the officer's lawful
acts in this case.41 Consequently, the Court held that because the officer
acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the magistrate's finding for
probable cause, the benefits of the suppression of the evidence were
outweighed by the substantial costs of exclusion. 42 As such, the Court
reversed the court of appeals findings. 43
B. Traffic Stops and the Fourth Amendment: The Reasonable Suspicion
Requirement
When there is a temporary detention of an individual during a stop of
their automobile by the police, even if for only a brief period and when
geared towards a limited purpose, there is a "seizure" of the "persons"
within the meaning prescribed in the Fourth Amendment. 44 As such, a
traffic stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 45 To
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 920–921.
Id. at 925–926.
Id. at 902–904.
Id. at 926.
Id. at 920–921.
Id. at 926.
Id. at 927.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–810 (1996).
Id.
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ensure that a traffic stop does not become unreasonable, an officer must
have reasonable suspicion to make the initial stop. 46 An officer has a
reasonable suspicion to make a stop when there is a "particularized and
objective" basis for suspecting that the person is violating some law. 47
Hence, a traffic stop in compliance with the Fourth Amendment must
have some rational basis.48
C. Historical Background: Does the Fourth Amendment Require the
Exclusion of Evidence Obtained from a Stop Unlawfully Prolonged
by Unrelated Inquiry?
1. Preceding Supreme Court Cases: Unrelated Inquiry
Permissible if No Time Added to the Stop
In Illinois v. Caballes,49 the Supreme Court of the United States
found that officers had not unlawfully prolonged a traffic stop by
making use of a narcotics-detection dog.50 In this particular case, the
original officer stopped the defendant for speeding on the highway and
proceeded to radio dispatch to report it, causing another officer to come
to the place of incident with a narcotics-detection dog. While the
original officer was issuing the warning ticket, the second officer took
the dog around the defendant's car, which alerted the dog to marijuana
in the trunk.51 Based on these facts, the Court determined that the
original officer had reasonable suspicion in making the original stop
due to the defendant's speeding.52
In addition, the Court determined that the stop did not constitute an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.53 Though the dog
sniff served as unrelated inquiry, the Court concluded that it did not
make the stop unlawful because while one officer was issuing the
warning ticket, therefore carrying out the general purpose of the traffic
stop, the other officer conducted the dog sniff without adding time to
the stop.54 Consequently, the Court held that the traffic stop was not
unlawful.55

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–418 (1981).
Id. at 418.
See id.
543 U.S. 405 (2005).
Id. at 409–410
Id. at 406.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 410.
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Four years later, in Arizona v. Johnson,56 the Supreme Court of the
United States considered the same question. In this particular case,
detectives of Arizona's gang task force pulled over a vehicle with
multiple passengers because the vehicles' registration was expired.
After stopping the vehicle, while one of the detectives dealt with the
ordinary inquiries of the traffic violation, the other detective began to
question the defendant about his possible gang affiliation. Based on her
concerns of his possible gang affiliation, the detective had the defendant
get out of the vehicle and patted him down, revealing a gun. The
defendant was then arrested.57
The Court held that the traffic stop did not constitute an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 58 The Court
concluded that its finding was proper for two reasons. 59 First, the
defendant was lawfully detained incident to a legitimate traffic stop.60
Second, although the detective's inquiry regarding the defendant's gang
affiliation was unrelated to the matter of the stop, because the other
detective was following up on the issuance of the ticket, no time had
been added to it.61 Thus, the Court held that the stop was lawful.62
2. The Eleventh Circuit Weighs In: Unrelated Inquiry
Permitted if Satisfying an "Overall Reasonableness" Standard
In United States v. Griffin,63 the Eleventh Circuit considered an issue
regarding the prolongation of traffic stops.64 Here, the officer
apprehended the defendant in regard to his possibly committing a theft,
so he stopped and frisked him. During the frisk, the officer asked the
defendant if he had batteries in his pocket and if he had ever been to
prison. Upon learning that the defendant had shotgun shells in his
pocket and had previously been to prison, the officer arrested the
defendant because it is illegal for felons to have ammunition on their
person.65

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009).
Id. at 327–328.
See id. at 333–334.
See id. at 333.
Id. at 332.
See id. at 333.
See id. at 334.
696 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1357
Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit held that this traffic stop had not become an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 66 The court
determined that there was reasonable suspicion in stopping and
frisking the defendant for theft. 67 Additionally, the court determined
that the unrelated inquiry regarding the contents in the defendant's
pockets and his criminal history, lasting for about thirty seconds, did
not make the stop unlawful because the officer had yet to complete his
investigation into the theft and acted diligently in pursuing his
investigation.68 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit denied "to adopt a brightline 'no-prolongation' rule,"69 instead adopting an overall
reasonableness standard.70
3. The Tables Finally Turn: Rodriguez v. United States71
In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court rejected its earlier approaches in
regard to the prolongation of a traffic stop. 72 In this particular case, the
officer stopped the defendant for driving on the shoulder of the
highway. After the officer checked the defendant's driver license and
issued the warning ticket, and the defendant refused to allow a dog
sniff around his vehicle, the officer detained him and waited for another
officer to get to the traffic stop. Once the second officer arrived, the
original officer completed the dog sniff and found meth in the vehicle,
this unrelated inquiry lasting for seven to eight minutes. 73

66. Id. at 1363.
67. Id. at 1359–1360..
68. Id. at 1362.
69. The "no-prolongation" rule finds that an officer must complete his traffic-based
inquiries in an amount of time which is reasonably required to complete the stop's
mission, and if the traffic stop is extended beyond that time, then it becomes unlawful.
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015). For a general discussion on the
development of the no-prolongation rule in each circuit after the Rodriguez decision, see
Elizabeth Williams, Permissibility Under Fourth Amendment of Detention of Motorist by
Police, Following Lawful Stop for Traffic Offense, to Investigate with Canine Matters Not
Related to Offense—Federal Cases Post Rodriguez v. U.S., 39 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 (2019).
The no-prolongation rule may be differentiated from the "overall reasonableness"
standard.
In applying the overall reasonableness standard to the issue of the
prolongation of a traffic stop, judges, "[D]o not simply look at the interval of prolongation
in isolation, but rather assess the length of the stop as a whole, including any extension of
the encounter, by undertaking a fact-bound, context-dependent analysis of all of the
circumstances concerning the stop and the unrelated questions." Griffin, 696 F.3d at
1362.
70. See Griffin, 696 F.3d at 1362.
71. 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015).
72. Id. at 1616.
73. Id. at 1612–1613.
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In Rodriguez, the Court held that any traffic stop that is extended
beyond the amount of time reasonably required to complete the stop's
mission, is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. 74 The Court
concluded that if the officer added time to the stop by diverting from the
stop's purpose after he had already completed his traffic-based inquiry
by way of the dog sniff, the traffic stop, then, turned into an
unreasonable seizure because of his attempt to investigate other
crimes.75 Thus, the Court denied to adopt a de minimus intrusion or
overall reasonableness standard.76
D. The Eleventh Circuit on the Preservation of Issue Requirement on
Appeal
1. The Dean Witter Reynolds Decision: The Preservation of
Issue Requirement as a "Mere Rule of Practice"
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez,77 a brokerage firm filed a
suit against a Cuban entity on the basis that it had made conflicting
claims to the funds and securities on its books. The district court
determined that it had jurisdiction over the claim and ordered the
complainant to pay the Cuban entity because they had been defrauded
of credit proceeds, despite the fact that the Cuban entity never got the
license required by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 78 which
required Cuban Nationals to get licensed if they desired to make any
transactions in the United States. The complainant appealed the
district court's decision on the basis that the Cuban entity never
obtained a license prior to initiating the suit. In its appellate brief,
however, the appellant never challenged the court's jurisdiction at the
district court level to hear the case prior to the issuance of the
appropriate license.79
Despite the appellant's failure to challenge the district court's
jurisdiction at the district court level, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that it would hear the issue.80 The court stated that an appellate court
generally will not hear a legal issue or theory unless it was presented to
the trial court, but made clear that this was merely a rule of practice

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1616.
Id. at 1616–1617.
See id. at 1616.
741 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 1984).
31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101–515.901 (2019).
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 741 F.2d at 357–359.
Id. at 361.
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and not a jurisdictional limitation.81 The court considered several
exceptional circumstances for which a court may use its discretion and
deviate from the preservation of issue requirement, one of which being
when the issue presents a significant question of general impact or
"great public concern."82 In the case at bar, the court held that the great
public concern exception applied because the purpose of the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations was to deny access to American dollars
without a license.83 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit did not follow the
preservation of issue requirement.84
2. Later Cases Declining to Deviate from the Preservation of
Issue Requirement
Almost twenty years later, in United States v. Jernigan,85 the
Eleventh Circuit refused to use its discretionary authority to hear an
issue not preserved for appeal.86 In this case, the defendant and his
passenger were pulled over because of an expired license plate. Upon
being pulled over, the officer determined that the defendant was a
convicted felon and proceeded to search his vehicle, finding a semiautomatic pistol. The defendant was charged with possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon and the state moved to introduce evidence
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),87 of the defendants past
crimes.88 At the district court, the defendant properly raised an issue in
regard to the introduction of his past crimes under Rule 404(b).
However, on appeal, the defendant made four passing references to the
evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) in his briefs to the appellate
court.89
Because of this mistake, the court held that the defendant had
waived his 404(b) claim that he had properly preserved at trial, as a
party seeking to raise a claim on appeal must plainly and prominently
so indicate the issue or it will be considered as abandoned.90 As such,
because the defendant did not devote a discrete section of his appellate
brief to claims regarding the evidence of his past crimes, the court

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 360.
Id. at 360–361.
Id. at 360.
Id.
341 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1284 n.8.
FED. R. EVID. 404(B).
Id. at 1276–1277.
Id. at 1284 n.8.
Id.
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would not consider the argument.91 Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the defendant abandoned the issue on appeal. 92
A year later, in Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines,93 the Eleventh
Circuit decided once again that it would not hear an issue being raised
for the first time on appeal. 94 Here, a complainant brought suit against
Southwest Airlines under the American Disabilities Act, 95 because the
website was virtually inaccessible to those with serious vision problems.
In making this claim, the complainant originally stated that Southwest
Airlines was a public accommodation, but the district court denied this
claim.96 On appeal, however, the appellant argued for the first time that
Southwest.com was a "travel service" and not a public accommodation. 97
Despite the appellant's instantaneous change of argument, the court
declined to use its discretion to hear the issue being raised for the first
time on appeal.98 The court reasoned that they would not hear this new
argument because the complainant's brief did not "contain, under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated . . . a statement of the
issues presented for review."99 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit declined to
consider the complainant's new claim on appeal that Southwest.com
was a travel service.100
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE
In United States v. Campbell,101 the Eleventh Circuit held that the
good-faith reliance exception applied to the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule where the officer reasonably relied on the binding
precedent in Griffin.102 In so holding, the court relied on an argument
which was never raised on appeal, failing to adhere to the preservation
of issue requirement.103
In coming to its decision, the court first affirmed the district court's
holding that McCannon did have reasonable suspicion in stopping

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. at 1284 n.5.
385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1335.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2019).
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1330 (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 28(A)(5)).
Id. at 1335.
912 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1355–1356.
Id.
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Campbell for being in violation of Georgia law because his signal light
was not in good working condition.104 Because the court determined
that McCannon was justified in stopping Campbell for this traffic
offense, it did not address the validity of the claim that Campbell failed
to maintain his lane.105
Next, the court considered whether McCannon's unrelated inquiry as
to the existence of contraband, drugs, or dead bodies in the car, lasting
for twenty-five seconds, turned the traffic stop into an unreasonable
seizure.106 In so doing, the court first considered precedent cases from
the Supreme Court of the United States on the issue that determined
that unrelated inquiry was permitted so long as there was only a de
minimis intrusion.107 The court found support for this standard in
Caballes, where the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
unrelated inquiry of a narcotics-detection dog did not turn a traffic stop
into an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment because no
more time was added than necessary to complete it. 108 Further, the
court looked to Johnson, where the Supreme Court of the United States
held that an officers unrelated inquiry regarding a defendant's gang
affiliation did not turn a stop into an unreasonable seizure under the
Fourth Amendment because no more time was added than necessary to
handle the traffic stop for expired tags.109
Next, the court considered one of its earlier decisions in Griffin,
which is significant because it was the controlling law at time of
Campbell's arrest.110 As decided by the court, the officer's unrelated
inquiry in Griffin was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment
because the officer had yet to complete his investigation and was acting
diligently in attempting to resolve a theft when he inquired about the
items in the defendants pocket and his prior criminal history. 111 As
such, the court stated that the court in Griffin adopted an overall
reasonableness standard.112
Finally, the court considered Rodriguez, where the Supreme Court of
the United States disrupted the law as it was in regard to the

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1350–1351.
See id.
Id. at 1354-1355.
See id. at 1351–1352.
Id. at 1351.
Id.
Id. at 1352.
Id. at 1352–1353.
Id. at 1352.
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prolongation of a traffic stop.113 As stated by the Court, after Rodriguez,
all traffic stops that are prolonged after the completion of their mission
through unrelated inquiry are unlawful and in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.114 Despite the holding in Rodriguez, the court decided
that Griffin applied because it was the law at the time of Campbell's
arrest.115 As such, because McCannon had yet to complete his
investigation of the traffic stop and was acting diligently in issuing the
warning ticket for Campbell's traffic violation when he inquired about
contraband, drugs, and dead bodies, his unrelated inquiry was not in
violation of the Fourth Amendment under Griffin.116
Further, the court stated that even though McCannon's actions
would be deemed as unlawful under the subsequent ruling in
Rodriguez, because McCannon relied in good-faith on the precedent set
in Griffin that would have made his acts lawful, the good-faith reliance
exception applied.117 The court concluded that because the exclusionary
rule is meant to deter unlawful conduct by the police, application of it in
this instance would result in a miscarriage of justice because the police
officer's conduct was lawful at the time he acted.118
In applying the good-faith reliance exception, the court rejected to
follow the preservation of issue requirement on the basis that it was a
mere rule of practice that may be deviated from in exceptional
circumstances.119 The court reasoned that the preservation of issue
requirement was a prudential doctrine which the court had
discretionary authority in ignoring in "exceptional circumstances." 120
The court failed to, however, explicitly state which one of these
exceptional circumstances that it was applying to justify their deviation
from the preservation of issue requirement.121 Still, the court stated
113. Id. at 1353.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1355.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1356.
118. Id. at 1355–1356.
119. Id. at 1355.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 1355–1356. For a list of the five exceptions for which a court will
generally deviate from the preservation of issue requirement, see Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 360–361 (11th Cir. 1984). Of these exceptions, the court
could have concluded that the "great public concern" exception applied. Being that the
central purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful conduct, because McCannon's
conduct was not unlawful under the binding precedent in place at the time of Campbell's
arrest, there could be great public concern in applying the exclusionary rule to his lawful
acts. The court, however, failed to address the applicability this exception. This is because
the argument ultimately fails, as the court's decision to deviate from the preservation of
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that it would not strictly adhere to the doctrine and found in favor of
the government on the basis of the good-faith reliance exception.122
Concurring in part and dissenting in part with the majority opinion,
Judge Martin agreed with the court that Griffin was controlling.123
Most notably, however, Judge Martin rejected the court's contention
that the good-faith reliance exception should be heard because the
government never preserved the issue for appeal. 124 Judge Martin
stated that the government did not argue the good-faith exception in its
initial brief, at oral arguments, or in any supplemental filing, but
merely submitted it during briefing to the district court, despite the
general law requiring a legal issue to be prominently and plainly raised
on appeal if it is to be heard.125 Further, Judge Martin found issue with
the fact that the court only seemed to strictly adhere to the preservation
of issue requirement when barring arguments made by criminal
defendants and pro se litigants.126 Judge Martin referenced several
cases where appellate courts refused to hear arguments made by
criminal defendants and pro se litigants which were not properly
preserved for appeal.127 Thus, Judge Martin stated that the court
extended a courtesy to the government which it rarely does to criminal
defendants and pro se litigants.128
IV. IMPLICATIONS
One direct implication of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Campbell,
is that it sets a precedent which allows the government to be unfairly
advantaged in a scenario where defendants are never extended

issue requirement for the government but to strictly adhere to it when concerning
defendants, causes there to be concern as to whether laws are being applied equitably.
Thus, the court should not apply the great public concern exception to the instant case
because its holding would, in effect, create great public concern where the ideal is to avoid
it.
122. Id. at 1356.
123. Id. at 1356 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1356.
126. Id. at 1358.
127. Id. at 1357; See, e.g., Hall v. Thomas, 611 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding a
juvenile sentenced to life imprisonment waived certain arguments raised in his habeas
petition by failing to reassert them on appeal); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874
(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) ("While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally,
issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned." (citation
omitted)).
128. See Campbell, 912 F.3d at 1358 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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leeway.129 The law is clear that the preservation of issue requirement is
merely a rule of practice which may be deviated from at the discretion
of the court.130 However, the justification behind such deviation is lost
when the court appears to deviate from the rule of practice for the
purpose of unfairly extending a benefit to one of its counterparts, the
government.131 This acts as a severe form of injustice. This is so because
an overly sophisticated party, the government, is given a courtesy
which is generally denied to defendants. 132 This very case provides
evidence of this inequity.133 As stated in Martin's dissenting opinion:
Both the government and the panel of judges suggested that
Campbell waived his fruit-of-the-poisonous tree argument because,
although plainly mentioned in his opening brief, the issue was not
separately listed as a claim in Campbell's "Statement of Issues". See
Oral Arg. At 11:36-11:44 ("We have a hard-and-fast rule in this
circuit. It's pretty punitive, really. That if you don't put it in the brief
as an issue, we don't consider it. (comment of Judge Tjoflat)), 13:4014:20 (government arguing that Court should deem waived issues not
prominently raised in a brief, because "[w]hen we're coming before
this court it's important that we know as the responding party, as the
appellee, what issues the appellant believes are germane").134

This excerpt from oral arguments serves as evidence that the court
sought to unfairly benefit the government over the defendant. 135 Judge
Tjoflat is cited in the oral argument saying that the preservation of
issue requirement is a hard-and-fast rule in the Eleventh Circuit when
it concerns an issue not properly raised by the criminal defendant on
129. See id.
130. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 741 F.2d at 360.
131. See Campbell, 912 F.3d at 1358 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
132. See id. at 1357. It may be argued, however, that defendants have a courtesy
extended to them which is denied to the government: the ability to appeal a lower court's
findings when they aren't acquitted. On this basis, the government could contend that the
court was correct in extending a courtesy to them by deviating from the preservation of
issue requirement because they are unable to appeal their losses. However, the
Constitution's Fifth Amendment "double jeopardy" clause provides reasoning behind this
difference. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. The Fifth Amendment states in relevant part, "[N]or
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
Id. Thus, the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause protects people from multiple
prosecutions for the same offense, and therefore, justifies a courtesy being denied to the
government on that basis. See id.
133. See Campbell, 912 F.3d at 1357–1358 (Martin, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
134. Id. at 1357.
135. See id.
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appeal.136 Shockingly, Judge Tjoflat says the exact opposite in the
majority opinion, suggesting a much more relaxed standard as it
pertains to the preservation of issue requirement when it applies to the
government, deeming it a mere rule of practice.137 Further, in the
explanation of its deviation from the preservation of issue requirement,
the majority failed to identify one exceptional circumstance which
would justify its course of action.138 The court fails to name any
exception justifying its deviation because there is not one which applies
to this case; the court solely sought to prejudice the defendant.
More broadly, beyond standing to destroy uniformity in appellate
procedural law, the court's decision will cause people to lose confidence
and trust in approaching the legal system. These ramifications are
serious and long-lasting. In making this holding, the Eleventh Circuit
makes it so unsophisticated parties, such as criminal defendants, will
not be properly notified of the arguments to be made against them, and
will therefore, be given no opportunity to respond to them. 139 This
implication significantly moves to undermine the adversarial nature of
the courts, being that an appellee will not be aware of the scope of the
issues appealed.140 This has a detrimental effect, as people will not
believe that they can properly defend themselves when courts can
determine on the fly when they are willing to deviate from hard-andfast rules of the court and who they are willing to do it for.141 Thus, the
majority's holding creates an uneven playing field that defendants will
never win on.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
part).

Id.
Id. at 1355 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1355–1356.
Pignons S.A. de Mecanique v. Polaroid Corp., 701 F.2d 1, 3 (1983).
See id.
See Campbell, 912 F.3d. at 1358 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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